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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
right to have it complied with, he could waive his right and enforce the prior
sentence.
The District Attorney claimed that Section 2189-a was enacted for the
benefit of the public to be sure that sex offenders would be rehabilitated before
release from prison or probation and therefore the requirements could not be
waived by the defendant. Since the Court found Section 2189-a was sub-
stantially complied with it did not have to pass on the question of waiver
and therefore the question remains to be adjudicated in a future case.
CO,-TM NT TO MENTAL HOSPrAL AFTER CONVICTION
CONSTITUTES JUDGM3ENT
Upon the relator's entry of a plea of guilty, in 1935, to a charge of grand
larceny, he was committed to Napanoch in accordance with Section 438 of
the Correction Law. This section provides that only "A male mental defective
over 16 years of age convicted of a criminal offense . . ." may be sent to this
institution. At the time of this commitment, he was not present in the court.
In 1940, about two years after his release from another mental hospital to
which he had been transfered, the relator was convicted of burglary and sen-
tenced as a second offender. In People ex rel. Vischi v. Martin, the relator
brought a kabeas corpus proceeding alleging that his committment to Napa-
noch was improper and therefore he should not have been convicted as a
second offender. The Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the Appellate
Division's affirmance of the order of the County Court dismissing the writ. 17
In his attempt to vacate his conviction as a second offender, the relator
argued that under Section 438, commitment to Napanoch constitutes a con-
viction of the crime charged and therefore is a judgment for purposes of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 473 of the Code, however, requires that
the defendant be present in the court when judgment for a felony conviction
is pronounced. In addition, Sections 471,18 472,19 and 48020 of the Code re-
quire other procedures which must be followed in the pronouncement of judg-
ment, which were not compiled with at the time of the Napanoch commit-
ment. Therefore, that conviction should be vacated and he should be remanded
for resentencing as a first offender.
Respondent, the warden of Attica State Prison, contended that relator's
commitment to Napanoch was a conviction, but not a judgment, and there-
fore the above requirements of the Code are not applicable. The two reasons
17. 8 A.D.2d 768, 187 N.Y.S.2d 339 (4th Dep't 1959), rev'd 8 N.Y.2d 63, 201
N.Y.S.2d 753 (1960).
18. Provides that "After a plea or verdict of guilty . . . the court must appoint a
time for pronouncing judgment."
19. Provides that "The time appointed [for pronouncing judgment] must be at
least two days after the verdict . . ."
20. Provides that "When the defendant appears for judgment he must be asked by
the clerk whether he have any legal cause to show why judgment should not be pro-
nounced against him."
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for this position were that the relator's 1935 plea of guilty made any adjudi-
cation of guilt unnecessary, and secondly, his committment to Naponch, a
mental institution, postponed the sentencing until he was mentally capable of
being sentenced.21
The Court of Appeals held that a commitment to Napanoch under Sec-
tion 438 of the Correction Law constitutes both a conviction and a judgment.
For Section 438 specifically provides that only upon conviction shall a male
be committed, and therefore committment is judgment. The Court went on to
hold that the failure of the lower court to comply with those sections of the
Code relating to the pronouncement of judgment, Section 473 in particular,
entitled the relator to be remanded for commitment to Napanoch, but not to
a complete vacatur of this conviction. If, upon this remand, he can show
legal cause why he should not have been so committed, in accordance with
Section 480 of the Code,22 only then will his conviction as a second offender
be set aside.
RIGHTs OF DEFENDANT UNDER SECTIONS 472 OR 480 OF THE CODE OF CRM-
NAL PROCEDURE
Does a violation of Section 472 or Section 480 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure work a vacatur of both the sentence and the conviction of the de-
fendant?
The Court of Appeals was faced with this question in the cases of Peo. ex
tel. La Shombe v. Jackson23 and Peo. ex tel. Emanuel v. McMann.24
In the La Shombe case, the relator was convicted of second degree assault
in 1947. Subsequently, in 1955, he pleaded guilty to four counts of an indict-
ment and was sentenced as a second felony offender. In his habeas corpus
application, the relator contended that he was improperly sentenced as a
second offender because the court, in the prior conviction of 1947, had failed
to accord him a two-day delay prior to pronouncing sentence as required by
Section 472. Relator argued that such omission requires the vacatur of the
original sentence and conviction of 1947, and that he should be resentenced
as a first felony offender for the 1955 conviction. The Clinton County Court
sustained the writ and the Appellate Division reversed on the law and facts. 25
In the Emanuel case, the relator was also sentenced as a second felony
offender. He, too, sought resentencing as a first offender on the basis that the
first sentence and conviction should be vacated since the trial court in the first
conviction failed to comply with the requirements of Section 480, in that the
clerk did not ask him if he had any legal cause as to why judgment should
21. See 7324 Cases In Points, Case 8, Respondents' Brief, pp. 6-8. Respondent relied
on People v. Eckert, 179 Misc. 181, 39 N.Y.S.2d 79 (County Ct. 1942).
22. Supra note 20.
23. 7 N.Y.2d 345, 197 N.Y.S.2d 177 (1960).
24. 7 N.Y.2d 342, 197 N.Y.S.2d 174 (1960).
25. 8 A.D.2d 650, 184 N.Y.S.2d 949 (3d Dep't 1959).
